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Abstract
We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent,
one-dimensional, private types. We prove that for any Bayesian incentive compatible
mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism
that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante
expected social surplus. The short proof is based on an extension of an elegant result
due to Gutmann et al. (Annals of Probability, 1991). We also show that the equivalence
between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation generally breaks down when the
main assumptions underlying the social choice model are relaxed, or when the equivalence
concept is strengthened to apply to interim expected allocations.
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1. Introduction
In an inspiring recent contribution, Manelli and Vincent (2010) revisit Bayesian and dominant
strategy implementation in the context of standard single-unit, private-value auctions. They
prove that for any Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) auction there exists an equivalent
dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) auction that yields the same interim expected
utilities for all agents. This equivalence result is surprising and valuable because dominant
strategy implementation has important advantages over Bayesian implementation. In particu-
lar, dominant strategy implementation is robust to changes in agents’ beliefs and does not rely
on the assumptions of a common prior and equilibrium play.
The definition of equivalence in terms of interim expected utilities is a conceptual innovation
of Manelli and Vincent (2010). Most of the earlier literature concerns the implementation of
social choice functions (or correspondences) and defines two mechanisms to be equivalent if
they provide the same ex post allocation.1 Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) show that the
latter condition for BIC-DIC equivalence generally fails unless the BIC allocation rule is itself
monotonic in each coordinate. In contrast, Manelli and Vincent (2010) are not concerned with
the implementation of a given allocation rule but rather construct, for any allocation rule that
is Bayesian implementable, another allocation rule that is dominant strategy implementable
and that delivers the same interim expected utilities.2
In this paper, we show that BIC-DIC equivalence extends to social choice environments
with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private types. Moreover, we present a
novel and powerful proof method based on an elegant mathematical theorem due to Gutmann
et al. (1991), which relates to some of the mathematical underpinnings of computed tomog-
raphy.3 The theorem states that for any bounded, non-negative function of several variables
that generates monotone, one-dimensional marginals, there exists a non-negative function that
respects the same bound, generates the same one-dimensional marginals, and is monotone in
each coordinate.4 The proof shows how the desired function can be found as a solution to a
convex minimization problem.
1See, e.g., Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975), and Roberts (1979).
2A main focus of the mechanism design literature concerns the implementation of efficient mechanisms, e.g.
Green and Laffont (1977), d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979), Laffont and Maskin (1979), and Williams
(1999). In contrast, the BIC-DIC equivalence result of Manelli and Vincent (2010) applies to every BIC auction,
not just efficient ones. See Goeree and Kushnir (2012) for a geometric approach to BIC-DIC equivalence.
3Gutmann et al. (1991) build on earlier contributions by Lorenz (1949), Gale (1957), Ryser (1957), Kellerer
(1961), and Strassen (1965), who studied the existence of measures with given marginals in various discrete or
continuous settings. Their insights are relevant to the analysis of reduced form auctions, e.g., Border (1991).
4Simply taking the product of the one-dimensional marginals and normalizing by the sum of marginals does
not generally work. It results in a monotone function that produces the same marginals, but one that does not
necessarily respect the same bound.
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The original Gutmann et al. (1991) theorem pertains to a single function, which restricts
its direct applicability to settings with two alternatives or to symmetric settings where all
agents’ utilities share the same functional form.5 In order to analyze more general social choice
environments we prove an extension of this theorem. The extension involves minimizing a
quadratic functional of several functions satisfying certain boundary and marginal constraints.
We use this minimization procedure to construct, for any BIC mechanism, an equivalent DIC
mechanism.
Within the context of auction design the implications of BIC-DIC equivalence can be high-
lighted as follows. BIC-DIC equivalence implies that any auction, including any optimal auction
(in terms of efficiency or revenue), can be implemented using a dominant strategy mechanism
and nothing can be gained from designing more intricate auction formats with possibly more
complex Bayes-Nash equilibria. This holds not only for single-unit auctions but also for multi-
unit auctions with homogeneous or heterogeneous goods, combinatorial auctions, and the like,
as long as bidders’ private values are one-dimensional and independent and utilities are linear.
We also delineate the limits of BIC-DIC equivalence. We first consider an alternative def-
inition of equivalence that requires the same interim expected allocations. In the single-unit,
private-value auction context studied by Manelli and Vincent (2010), this condition is equiv-
alent to the existence of transfers that yield the same interim expected utilities for all agents.
For the social choice environments studied in this paper, however, the two notions do not
necessarily coincide. In particular, demanding the same interim allocations implies that there
exist transfers such that agents’ interim expected utilities are the same, but the converse is not
necessarily true. Using a simple public goods example with three social alternatives we show
that the condition that the interim allocations are the same cannot generally be met.
Next, using a series of simple auction examples we demonstrate that BIC-DIC equivalence
generally fails when utilities are not linear or when types are not independent, one-dimensional,
or private. In other words, once we relax the assumptions underlying our model, Bayesian
implementation may have advantages over dominant strategy implementation. For example,
we show that ex ante social surplus may be strictly higher under BIC implementation when
values are interdependent. Likewise, with multi-dimensional values, BIC mechanisms may
result in higher revenues than can be attained by any DIC mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the social choice environment. We
prove our main BIC-DIC equivalence result in Section 3 and delineate its limits in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs omitted in the main text.
5For instance, in a two-alternative social choice setting this single function can describe the probability with
which one of the alternatives occurs while the other alternative occurs with complementary probability.
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2. Model
We consider an environment with a finite set I = {1, 2, . . . , I} of risk-neutral agents and
a finite set K = {1, 2, . . . , K} of social alternatives. Agent i’s utility in alternative k equals
uki (xi, ti) = a
k
i xi+c
k
i + ti where xi is agent i’s private type, a
k
i , c
k
i ∈ R are constants with aki ≥ 0,
and ti ∈ R is a monetary transfer. Agent i’s type xi is distributed according to probability
distribution λi with support Xi, where the type space Xi ⊆ R can be any (possibly discrete)
subset of R. Note that types are one-dimensional and independent. Let A denote the matrix
with elements aki where the player index i corresponds to the rows and the social alternative
index k corresponds to the columns. Furthermore, let X =
∏
i∈I Xi and λ =
∏
i∈I λi.
Our model fits many classical applications of mechanism design, including auctions (e.g.
Myerson, 1981), public goods (e.g. Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990), bilateral trade (e.g. Myer-
son and Satterthwaite, 1983), and screening models (e.g. Mussa and Rosen, 1978). However,
it is important to point out that even within the restricted class of linear environments, one-
dimensional types generally cannot capture the full space of agents’ possible preferences in
arbitrary social choice environments.
Without loss of generality we consider only direct mechanisms characterized by K + I
functions, {qk(x)}k∈K and {ti(x)}i∈I , where x = (x1, . . . , xI) ∈ X is the profile of reports,
qk(x) ≥ 0 is the probability that alternative k is implemented with ∑k∈K qk(x) = 1, and ti(x)
is the monetary transfer agent i receives. When agent i reports x′i and all other agents report
truthfully, the conditional expected probability (from agent i’s point of view) that alternative
k is chosen is Qki (x
′
i) = Ex−i(q
k(x′i,x−i)) and the conditional expected transfer to agent i is
Ti(x
′
i) = Ex−i(ti(x
′
i,x−i)). For later use we define, for i ∈ I and x ∈ X,
vi(x) ≡
∑
k∈K
aki q
k(x)
with marginals Vi(xi) =
∑
k∈K a
k
iQ
k
i (xi), and the modified transfers
τi(x) = ti(x) +
∑
k∈K
cki q
k(x)
with marginals Ti(xi) = Ex−i(τi(xi,x−i)) = Ti(xi) +
∑
k c
k
iQ
k
i (xi). When agent i’s type is xi
and she reports being of type x′i, her interim expected utility can then be written as
ui(x
′
i) = Vi(x
′
i)xi + Ti(x′i).
Finally, the ex ante expected social surplus is simply the sum of agents’ ex ante expected
utilities minus the sum of agents’ ex ante expected transfers.
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A mechanism (q˜, t˜) is BIC if truthful reporting by all agents constitutes a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. A mechanism (q, t) is DIC if truthful reporting is a dominant strategy equilibrium.
To relate BIC and DIC mechanisms we employ the following notion of equivalence.
Definition 1. Two mechanisms (q, t) and (q˜, t˜) are equivalent if and only if they deliver the
same interim expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante expected social surplus.
The definition of equivalence in terms of interim expected utilities follows Manelli and Vincent
(2010). In addition, we demand that the same ex ante expected social surplus is generated so
that no money needs to be inserted to match agents’ utilities.
3. BIC–DIC Equivalence
We first consider connected type spaces, i.e. Xi = [xi, xi] ⊆ R. In this case a mechanism is
BIC if and only if (i) for all i ∈ I and xi ∈ Xi, Vi(xi) is non-decreasing in xi and (ii) agents’
interim expected utilities satisfy
ui(xi) = ui(xi) +
∫ xi
xi
Vi(s)ds,
see, for instance, Myerson (1981). Similarly a mechanism is DIC if and only if (i) for all i ∈ I
and x ∈ X, vi(xi,x−i) is non-decreasing in xi and (ii) agents’ utilities can be expressed as
ui(xi,x−i) = ui(xi,x−i) +
∫ xi
xi
vi(s,x−i)ds,
e.g., Laffont and Maskin (1980). Hence, with connected type spaces, agents’ utilities are deter-
mined (up to a constant) by the allocation rule. This allows us to define equivalence in terms
of the allocation rule only. Consider two mechanisms (q, t) and (q˜, t˜) and transfers such that
ui(xi) = u˜i(xi) for all i ∈ I, then agents’ interim expected utilities are the same under the
two mechanisms if Vi(xi) = V˜i(xi) for all i ∈ I, xi ∈ Xi. Furthermore, the requirement that
expected social surplus is the same is met when the ex ante probabilities of each alternative
are the same for the two mechanisms, i.e. Ex(q
k(x)) = Ex(q˜
k(x)) for all k ∈ K. To see this,
note that ui(xi) = u˜i(xi) and Vi(xi) = V˜i(xi) imply Ti(xi) = T˜i(xi), so
Ex(ti(x)) = Ex(t˜i(x)) +
∑
k∈K
cki
(
Ex(q˜
k(x))− Ex(qk(x))
)
= Ex(t˜i(x))
Hence, the two mechanisms result in the same expected transfers and social surplus if the ex
ante probabilities with which each alternative occurs are identical.
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We now state and prove our main result. Define v(x) = A · q(x) with elements vi(x) =∑
k a
k
i q
k(x) for i ∈ I, and let || · || denote the usual Euclidean norm: ||v(x)||2 = ∑i∈I vi(x)2.
The qk(x) are elements of L∞(λ) endowed with the weak* topology. In particular, functions
that are equal almost everywhere with respect to λ are identified.
Theorem 1. Let Xi be connected for all i ∈ I and let (q˜, t˜) denote a BIC mechanism. An
equivalent DIC mechanism is given by (q, t), where the allocation rule q solves
min
{qk}k∈K
qk(x)≥ 0 ∀k,x∑
kq
k(x) = 1 ∀x
Vi(xi) = V˜i(xi) ∀i,xi
Ex(qk(x)) =Ex(q˜k(x)) ∀k
Ex
(||v(x)||2) (1)
and the transfers are given by ti(x) = τi(x)−
∑
k∈K c
k
i q
k(x) with
τi(xi,x−i) = τi(xi,x−i) + vi(xi,x−i)xi − vi(xi,x−i)xi +
∫ xi
xi
vi(s,x−i)ds, (2)
for x ∈ X, i ∈ I, where τi(xi,x−i) = (vi(xi,x−i)/V˜i(xi))T˜i(xi).6
The constraints in (1) define a non-empty and compact set,7 and the existence of a solution to (1)
is guaranteed because the functional Ex (||v(x)||2) is weak* lower semi-continuous (Gutmann
et al., 1991, pp. 1783-1784). The main difficulty is to establish that a solution vi(xi,x−i) to
(1) is non-decreasing in xi. We do so in three steps. First, we consider discrete and uniformly
distributed types (Lemma 1), then we extend to the continuous uniform types using a discrete
approximation (Lemma 2), and, finally, we generalize to arbitrary type distributions (Lemma
3). The first lemma is covered in the main text while the proofs for the more technical second
and third steps can be found in the Appendix.
To glean some intuition for the proof of Lemma 1 and for how it corresponds to the original
Gutmann et al. (1991) theorem, consider a symmetric single-unit auction with two bidders and
two equally-likely types, x and x. Symmetry allows us to describe the allocation rule with a
single function, which can be represented by a two-by-two matrix. Consider, for instance,
q˜ =
( 1
2
1
4
1
4
1
2
)
,
where the rows correspond to agent 1’s type and the columns to agent 2’s type, and the entries
correspond to the probabilities that the object is assigned to either agent. If agents’ types differ,
each agent receives the object with probability 1
4
(i.e., the object is not always assigned) and if
6Where 0/0 is interpreted as 1.
7The set is non-empty because q˜ satisfies the constraints and compactness follows from Alaoglu’s theorem.
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agents’ types are the same they each get the object with probability 1
2
. The allocation rule is
BIC, since the expected probability with which an agent receives the object is non-decreasing
in her type, but it is not DIC, since the probability that an agent gets the object is decreasing
in her type when the rival’s type is low. There is a one-dimensional family of symmetric and
feasible allocation rules with the same marginals
q˜ε =
( 1
2
− ε 1
4
+ ε
1
4
+ ε 1
2
− ε
)
,
where 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1
4
. Minimizing the sum of squared entries of the perturbed matrix q˜ε yields ε =
1
8
,
and the resulting allocation rule is everywhere non-decreasing. This is the original construction
of Gutmann et al. (1991) that applies to a single function. Lemma 1 extends this result to
settings with an arbitrary number of functions and more complex boundary constraints, thus
widening its applicability to general social choice problems.
Lemma 1. Suppose, for all i ∈ I, Xi is a discrete set and λi is uniform distribution on Xi.
Let {qk}k∈K be a solution to (1) then vi(x) =
∑
k a
k
i q
k(x) is non-decreasing in xi for all i ∈ I,
x ∈ X.
Proof. Suppose, in contradiction, that vj(xj,x−j) > vj(x′j,x−j) for some j, x
′
j > xj, and some
x−j. Since {q˜k}k∈K is a BIC mechanism Ex−j(vj(xj,x−j)) = Ex−j(v˜j(xj,x−j)) is non-decreasing
in xj. Hence, there exists x
′
−j for which vj(xj,x
′
−j) < vj(x
′
j,x
′
−j). Let α ≡ ε/(vj(xj,x−j) −
vj(x
′
j,x−j)) and α
′ ≡ ε/(vj(x′j,x′−j) − vj(xj,x′−j)). Then, for small enough ε > 0, we have
0 < α < 1 and 0 < α′ < 1. Define the perturbations
q′(xj,x−j) = (1− α)q(xj,x−j) + αq(x′j,x−j), q′(x′j,x−j) = (1− α)q(x′j,x−j) + αq(xj,x−j)
q′(xj,x′−j) = (1− α′)q(xj,x′−j) + α′q(x′j,x′−j), q′(x′j,x′−j) = (1− α′)q(x′j,x′−j) + α′q(xj,x′−j)
and q′(x) = q(x) for other x ∈ X. By construction q′k(x) ≥ 0 and ∑k∈K q′k(x) = 1 for all
x ∈ X. Also Ex(q′(x)) = Ex(q(x)) since q′(xj,x−j) + q′(x′j,x−j) + q′(xj,x′−j) + q′(x′j,x′−j) =
q(xj,x−j) + q(x′j,x−j) + q(xj,x
′
−j) + q(x
′
j,x
′
−j). We next show that the perturbations q
′ also
produce the same marginals as q. Rewrite the above perturbations in terms of v′(x) = A·q′(x):
v′(xj,x−j) = (1− α)v(xj,x−j) + αv(x′j,x−j), v′(x′j,x−j) = (1− α)v(x′j,x−j) + αv(xj,x−j)
v′(xj,x′−j) = (1− α′)v(xj,x′−j) + α′v(x′j,x′−j), v′(x′j,x′−j) = (1− α′)v(x′j,x′−j) + α′v(xj,x′−j)
and the equal-marginal condition as Ex−i(v
′
i(xi,x−i)) = Ex−i(vi(xi,x−i)). For i = j, this
condition follows from α(vj(xj,x−j)− vj(x′j,x−j)) = α′(vj(x′j,x′−j)− vj(xj,x′−j)) when xi = xj
or xi = x
′
j, while for other values of xi it follows trivially. For i 6= j, the condition follows since
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v′(xj,x−j) + v′(x′j,x−j) = v(xj,x−j) + v(x
′
j,x−j) and v
′(xj,x′−j) + v
′(x′j,x
′
−j) = v(xj,x
′
−j) +
v(x′j,x
′
−j). Finally,
Ex
(||v′(x)||2 − ||v(x)||2) = −2α(1− α)|X| ||v(xj,x−j)− v(x′j,x−j)||2
−2α
′(1− α′)
|X| ||v(x
′
j,x
′
−j)− v(xj,x′−j)||2
a contradiction since the right hand side is strictly negative and {qk}k∈K solves (1). Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. Suppose, for all i ∈ I, Xi = [0, 1] and λi is the uniform distribution on Xi. Let
{qk}k∈K denote a solution to (1) then vi(x) is non-decreasing in xi for all i ∈ I, x ∈ X.
The proof is in the Appendix. The idea is to consider a partition of [0, 1]K|X| and define a
discrete approximation of the {q˜k}k∈K by replacing the q˜k with their averages in each element
of the partition. Lemma 1 ensures that for this discrete approximation there exists a solution
{qk}k∈K to (1). The qk can be extended to piecewise constant functions over [0, 1]K|X|. The
result follows by considering increasingly finer partitions of [0, 1].
Lemma 3. Suppose, for all i ∈ I, Xi ⊆R and λi is some distribution on Xi. Let {qk}k∈K
denote a solution to (1). Then vi(x) is non-decreasing in xi for all i ∈ I, x ∈ X.
The proof is in the Appendix. The intuition is to consider a transformation of variables and
relate the uniform distribution covered by Lemma 2 to the case of a general distribution. In
particular, if the random variable Zi is uniformly distributed then λ
−1
i (Zi), with λ
−1
i (zi) =
inf{xi ∈ Xi|λi(xi) ≥ zi}, is distributed according to λi.
Proof of Theorem 1. Lemmas 1-3 establish that the allocation rule that solves (1) produces
non-decreasing vi(x). What remains to be shown is that the modified transfers τi(xi,x−i) in
(2) are such that the interim expected utilities ui(xi) in the DIC mechanism (q, t) are the same
as the interim expected utilities u˜i(xi) in the BIC mechanism (q˜, t˜). Taking expectations over
x−i in (2) yields
Ti(xi) = T˜i(xi) + Vi(xi)xi − Vi(xi)xi +
∫ xi
xi
Vi(s)ds
= T˜i(xi) + V˜i(xi)xi − V˜i(xi)xi +
∫ xi
xi
V˜i(s)ds
= u˜i(xi)− V˜i(xi)xi = T˜i(xi)
and, hence, ui(xi) = Vi(xi)xi + Ti(xi) = V˜i(xi)xi + T˜i(xi) = u˜i(xi). Furthermore, the constraint
that Ex(q
k(x)) = Ex(q˜
k(x)) for all k ∈ K ensures that the expected transfers are the same
under the BIC and DIC mechanisms, and, hence, so is expected social surplus. Q.E.D.
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Remark 1. The constructed equivalent DIC mechanism satisfies ex post individual rationality
if and only if the original BIC mechanism satisfies interim individual rationality. To see this,
note that the utility of the lowest type in the constructed DIC mechanism equals
vi(xi,x−i)xi + τi(xi,x−i) =
vi(xi,x−i)
V˜i(xi)
(
xiV˜i(xi) + T˜i(xi)
)
and the expression in parentheses on the right side is non-negative if and only if the BIC
mechanism (q˜, t˜) is interim individually rational. Ex post individual rationality for all other
types follows since the vi(xi,x−i) are non-decreasing in xi.
Remark 2. Theorem 1 can be adapted to include other objectives to construct different
equivalent DIC mechanisms. For example, we can replace the squared norm in the minimization
problem (1) by
∑
i∈I Ex
(Ci(vi(x))) where the Ci(·) can be arbitrary continuous, strictly convex
functions.
Remark 3. The constraint Ex(q
k(x)) = Ex(q˜
k(x)) ensures that the expected transfers and
social surplus are the same. This constraint is also important when there are additional costs
or benefits of implementing various alternatives or when the designer is not risk neutral.
Lemma 3 above applies to any distribution, not just continuous ones. We used the assumption
of continuous type spaces only to invoke payoff equivalence, which allowed us to define the DIC
transfers as in (2). We next prove BIC-DIC equivalence for discrete type spaces. For each i ∈ I
let Xi = {x1i , . . . , xNii }, where xni > xn−1i for n = 2, . . . , Ni. A mechanism (q˜, t˜) is BIC if and
only if (i) for all i ∈ I and xi ∈ Xi, V˜i(xi) is non-decreasing in xi and (ii) the transfers satisfy
(V˜i(x
n
i )− V˜i(xn−1i ))xn−1i ≤ T˜i(xn−1i )− T˜i(xni ) ≤ (V˜i(xni )− V˜i(xn−1i ))xni (3)
for n = 2, . . . , Ni. Similarly, a mechanism (q, t) is DIC if and only if (i) for all i ∈ I and x ∈ X,
vi(xi,x−i) is non-decreasing in xi and (ii) the transfers satisfy
(vi(x
n
i ,x−i)− vi(xn−1i ,x−i))xn−1i ≤ τi(xn−1i ,x−i)− τi(xni ,x−i) ≤ (vi(xni ,x−i)− vi(xn−1i ,x−i))xni
(4)
For n = 2, . . . , Ni let
αni ≡
T˜i(xn−1i )− T˜i(xni )
V˜i(xni )− V˜i(xn−1i )
when V˜i(x
n
i ) 6= V˜i(xn−1i ) and αni = xni otherwise.
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Theorem 2. Let Xi be discrete for all i ∈ I and let (q˜, t˜) denote a BIC mechanism. An
equivalent DIC mechanism is given by (q, t), where the allocation rule q solves (1) and the
transfers are given by ti(x) = τi(x)−
∑
k∈K c
k
i q
k(x) with
τi(x
n
i ,x−i) = τi(x
1
i ,x−i)−
n∑
m=2
(vi(x
m
i ,x−i)− vi(xm−1i ,x−i))αmi (5)
for n = 2, . . . , Ni, i ∈ I, where τi(x1i ,x−i) = (vi(x1i ,x−i)/V˜i(x1i ))T˜i(x1i ).
Remark 4. Payoff equivalence does not apply to the discrete type case, which allows for a
wider range of transfers and, generally, two mechanisms (q, t) and (q˜, t˜) can be equivalent even
when their marginals Vi(xi) and V˜i(xi) are not the same. Theorem 2 focuses on equivalent DIC
mechanisms that have the same marginals and the same expected transfers.
We end this section by comparing our approach to that of Manelli and Vincent (2010). Im-
portantly, our analysis is not restricted to the single-unit auction case and includes multi-unit
auctions for homogeneous and heterogeneous goods, combinatorial auctions, and the like.8
Moreover, our BIC-DIC equivalence result goes well beyond the auction context, see Section
4.1 where we apply it to a public goods provision problem.
But even for single-unit auctions, our approach differs in several respects. First, Manelli
and Vincent (2010) restrict attention to continuous distributions with connected supports. The
discrete case covered by our Theorem 2 thus provides an important extension of their results.
Second, Manelli and Vincent (2010) assume that cki = 0, which means that keeping the same
interim expected utility for all agents implies the same expected social surplus. In our setting,
the latter is ensured by the additional constraint Ex(q
k(x)) = Ex(q˜
k(x)) for all k ∈ K. Finally,
Manelli and Vincent (2010) first prove BIC-DIC equivalence for the case with symmetric bidders
(their Theorem 1), then introduce asymmetries between bidders (Theorem 2), and, finally, allow
for the seller to have her own private value for the object (Theorem 3).
These different cases are all covered by the minimization approach in (1). To see this,
consider a setup with I + 1 agents (I bidders plus one seller) and K = I + 1 alternatives. If
the seller has no private value for the object we simply set aii = 1 for i = 1, . . . , I and a
k
i = 0
otherwise (and cki = 0). By including the seller as the (I + 1)-th agent, the possibility that the
object does not sell is included. In fact, the constraint
∑
k∈K q
k(x) = 1 in (1) becomes
I∑
k=1
qk(x) = 1− qI+1(x),
which combined with Ex(q
k(x)) = Ex(q˜
k(x)) for all k ∈ K implies that if the seller does
not sell with some probability in the original BIC mechanism then she does not sell with the
8Assuming types are one-dimensional, independent, and private.
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Figure 1. BIC allocation rule (left) and DIC allocation rule (right) for β ≤ 1/2. Here (q1, q2)
represent the probabilities that bidders (1, 2) win the object.
same probability in the equivalent DIC mechanism. Furthermore, by including the seller as the
(I+1)-th agent, the minimization approach in (1) implies that the constructed DIC mechanism
generates the same expected revenue for the seller, since expected revenue is equal to minus the
sum of bidders’ expected transfers. To summarize, the constructed DIC mechanism is efficiency
and revenue equivalent to the original BIC mechanism.
Moreover, if the original BIC mechanism is symmetric, an equivalent symmetric DIC mech-
anism can be found by including symmetry as a constraint in (1).9 Alternatively, without this
additional constraint, one could symmetrize any solution to (1) by permuting the agents and
taking an average over all permutations.10 Finally, the minimization approach in (1) also
applies when the seller’s private value is distributed over some range. In this case, we simply
treat the seller like the bidders and set aii = 1 for i = 1, . . . , I + 1 and a
k
i = 0 otherwise.
To illustrate, consider a single-unit private value auction with I = 2 bidders whose values,
labeled x1 and x2, are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Suppose the seller
does not allocate the object if the difference between bidders’ values is too high,11 i.e. when
|x1−x2| > β where, for simplicity, we assume that β ≤ 1/2. In all other cases, the seller allocates
the object efficiently, see the left panel of Figure 1. The allocation rule is not monotone and,
hence, cannot be implemented in dominant strategies (Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 1992).
Denote the probability that bidder k = 1, 2 gets the object by q˜k and the probability that
the seller keeps the object by q˜3. So there are K = 3 social alternatives, a11 = a
2
2 = 1 and a
k
i = 0
9Note that the resulting constraint set is again non-empty, compact, and convex.
10Permuting the agents honors the constraints in (1) if the original BIC mechanism is symmetric.
11Suppose the xi for i = 1, 2 represent cost reductions from an innovation. A market regulator may prohibit
the introduction of the innovation when the cost reductions are too asymmetric to avoid the advantaged firm
being able to push the rival out of the market and gain monopoly power.
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otherwise (and cki = 0). For i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} the allocation rule can be stated as
q˜i(x) =

1 if xj < xi ≤ xj + β
1
2
if xi = xj
0 otherwise
while q˜3(x) = 1− q˜1(x)− q˜2(x). This allocation rule has non-decreasing marginals∫ 1
0
q˜i(x)dxj = min(xi, β)
for i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, and is thus Bayesian implementable. For β ≤ 1/2 the allocation rule
qi(x) = min(xi, β)
for i = 1, 2 and q3(x) = 1−min(x1, β)−min(x2, β) is a solution to minimization problem (1).
This solution is shown in the right panel of Figure 1. Since the qi are everywhere non-decreasing
in xi for i = 1, 2, they are dominant strategy implementable: supplemented with appropriate
payments, they define an equivalent DIC mechanism.
4. The Limits of BIC–DIC Equivalence
In this section we present a series of examples, based on environments with two agents and
discrete types, which delineate the limits of BIC-DIC equivalence. We start with a discussion
of a stronger equivalence notion while maintaining the main assumptions of the social choice
model: linear utilities, and independent, one-dimensional, private types. Subsequently we
return to the equivalence notion of Definition 1 while relaxing these assumptions. In each case,
we show how BIC-DIC equivalence fails.
4.1. Equivalence Based on Interim Expected Allocations
In this subsection we show that BIC-DIC equivalence breaks downs when requiring the same
interim expected allocation probabilities. This notion becomes relevant when, for instance, the
designer is not utilitarian or when preferences of agents outside the mechanism play a role.12
Definition 2. Two mechanisms (q, t) and (q˜, t˜) are equivalent if they deliver the same interim
expected allocation probabilities, i.e. Qki (xi) = Q˜
k
i (xi) for all i ∈ I, xi ∈ Xi, and k ∈ K.
12Consider, for example, a dynamic setting where a public decision affects both current and future generations.
The distribution of values for future agents may be unknown and may depend on current realizations. Thus,
current private information enters the “proxy” utility functions used for future agents, and a designer need not
be indifferent between two mechanisms that are equivalent from the point of view of the current agents.
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With continuous types, Definitions 1 and 2 are equivalent in settings with only two social
alternatives or in the single-unit auction setting studied by Manelli and Vincent (2010).13
More generally, however, requiring the same interim expected allocations is more stringent
than Definition 1 and we next show that it fails in a simple public goods setting.
Suppose there are K = 3 alternatives, e.g. building a tunnel or a bridge or neither, and
I = 2 symmetric agents, each with two equally likely and independent types x1 < x2. The
utility, net of any transfers, of an agent with type xj, for j = 1, 2, is xj + c1 in alternative 1,
axj + c2 with 0 < a ≤ 1 in alternative 2, and c3 (independent of the agent’s type) in alternative
3. The utility parameters are summarized by the matrices
A =
(
1 a 0
1 a 0
)
, C =
(
c1 c2 c3
c1 c2 c3
)
,
where rows correspond to agents and columns to social alternatives. To economize on notation
we also represent the allocation rule with two-by-two matrices, where the rows correspond to
agent 1’s type and the columns to agent 2’s type. Consider the following symmetric allocation
rule
q˜1 = as
(
1 1
1 13
)
, q˜2 = s
(
9 1
1 1
)
,
and q˜3 = 1 − q˜1 − q˜2 where s is some small number, say s = 1/20. Note that q˜1 + aq˜2 is not
increasing in each coordinate but its marginals (6as, 8as) are. In other words, the allocation rule
is BIC but not DIC. The symmetric allocation rules that are equivalent according to Definition
2 are summarized by14
qˆ1 = as
(
2− α α
α 14− α
)
, qˆ2 = s
(
10− β β
β 2− β
)
,
for 0 ≤ α ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 2. Note that qˆ1 + aqˆ2 is DIC only if 6 ≤ α+ β ≤ 8, a contradiction.
Of course, it is straightforward to solve the minimization problem in (1) to find equivalent DIC
allocation rules in the sense of Definition 1:
q1 = as
(
3 6
6 1
)
, q2 = s
(
2 1
1 8
)
,
so that q1 + aq2 is increasing in each coordinate.
4.2. Relaxing the Conditions of Theorems 1 and 2
In this subsection we demonstrate that BIC-DIC equivalence generally does not hold when we
relax the assumption of linear utilities or when types are not one-dimensional, private, and
13Since
∑
k∈K a
k
iQ
k
i (xi) =
∑
k∈K a
k
i Q˜
k
i (xi) reduces to Q
k
i (xi) = Q˜
k
i (xi) for all k ∈ K when there are only
K = 2 alternatives or when aki = 0 unless i = k as in the single-unit auction case. In addition, Definition 2
implies the ex ante probabilities of each alternative are the same, i.e. Ex(q
k(x)) = Ex(q˜
k(x)) for all k ∈ K.
14It is easy to see that an equivalent dominant strategy mechanism must be symmetric.
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independent. We will illustrate the breakdown of BIC-DIC equivalence using simple auction
examples. Recall from Section 3 that the constructed DIC mechanism is efficiency and revenue
equivalent to the original BIC mechanism, which will prove useful in understanding the design
of the counter-examples. Denote the seller’s expected revenue by R and expected social surplus
by W . Relaxing constraints in a revenue-maximization problem can only increase the achieved
revenue level, so
max
BIC, IR
R ≥ max
DIC, IR
R ≥ max
equivalent DIC, IR
R (6)
where IR, DIC, and BIC represent the interim individual rationality, dominant strategy in-
centive compatibility, and Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints respectively, and equiv-
alence refers to Definition 1. For BIC-DIC equivalence to hold, these conditions have to be
met with equality.15 Conversely, if one of the conditions does not hold with equality, e.g.
if the optimal DIC mechanism yields strictly less revenue than the optimal BIC mechanism,
then BIC-DIC equivalence fails. A similar logic applies to social surplus. Importantly, in (6)
we impose the same interim individual rationality constraints for all three cases so that any
differences between the DIC and BIC mechanisms are not due to differences in participation
constraints.
Interdependent Values
As noted by Manelli and Vincent (2010), Cremer and McLean (1988, Appendix A) construct
an example with correlated types for which a BIC mechanism extracts all surplus from the
buyers, while full-surplus extraction is not possible with a DIC mechanism. We therefore focus
here on a setting with interdependent values but with independent types.
In this environment it is more natural to employ the notion of ex post incentive compatibility
(EPIC), which requires that, for each type profile, agents prefer to report their types truthfully
when others do. This characterization is akin to the definition of DIC for private values settings
for which the two notions coincide (Bergemann and Morris, 2005). Unlike DIC, however, EPIC
does not depend on agents’ beliefs when there are value interdependencies.
Consider a discrete version of an example due to Maskin (1992). There are two bidders,
labeled i = 1, 2, who compete for a single object. There are K = 3 possible alternatives
corresponding to the cases where bidder 1 wins the object (k = 1), bidder 2 wins the object
(k = 2), or the seller keeps the object (k = 3). Bidder i’s value for the object is xi + 2xj, where
i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} and the signal xi is equally likely to be x1 = 1 or x2 = 10. Because of the higher
15It is important to point out that our BIC-DIC equivalence result in Section 3 is not constrained to revenue-
maximizing BIC mechanisms. Here we limit attention to surplus-maximizing and revenue-maximizing BIC
mechanisms only to derive conditions under which BIC-DIC equivalence fails.
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weight on the other’s signal, the first-best symmetric allocation rule is to assign the object to
the lowest-signal bidder (with ties broken randomly)
q1 =
(
1
2
1
0 1
2
)
,
and q2 = (q1)T , i.e. the transpose of q1, so that q3 = 1− q1 − q2 = 0, i.e. the object is always
assigned. (As before, the rows of the qk correspond to bidder 1’s type and the columns to bidder
2’s type.) The expected social surplus generated by the first-best allocation rule is W = 150/8.
Maskin (1992) used a continuous version of this example to show that the first-best al-
location rule is not Bayesian implementable. Here this follows simply because the marginals
are decreasing in a bidder’s signal. It is a simple linear programming problem to find the
surplus-maximizing allocation rule that respects Bayesian incentive compatibility:
q1 =
(
0 3
4
1
4
1
2
)
, (7)
and q2 = (q1)T , yielding a total surplus of W = 135/8. Note that this “second-best” allocation
rule does not always assign the object (q311 = 1) and that the marginal probability of winning is
constant. Importantly, the allocation rule is not monotone, so the second-best solution is not
ex post incentive compatible.16
For this example, the EPIC mechanism that maximizes surplus is given by
q1 =
(
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
)
,
and q2 = (q1)T , yielding a total surplus of W = 132/8. In other words, there exists no EPIC
mechanism that generates the same total surplus as the second-best solution in (7).
This non-equivalence result does not hinge on the assumptions of discrete types or the
fact that single crossing is violated.17 Suppose, for instance, that signals are continuous and
uniformly distributed and that bidder i’s value is xi + αxj for i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Consider the following continuous extension of the second-best BIC allocation rule in (7)
q˜1(x1, x2) =

0 if x1 <
1
2
, x2 <
1
2
3
4
if x1 <
1
2
, x2 ≥ 12
1
4
if x1 ≥ 12 , x2 < 12
1
2
if x1 ≥ 12 , x2 ≥ 12
16Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci (2012) previously demonstrated these properties for a continuous version
of Maskin’s (1992) example where the signals xi are uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. They also provide a general
characterization of second-best efficient mechanisms and show that, with two bidders, the second-best solution
can be implemented via an English auction (Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci, 2011).
17Singe crossing is violated because in the agent’s value the weight on the other’s signal is twice as large as
the weight on the agent’s own signal.
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and q˜2(x1, x2) = q˜
1(x2, x1). It is readily verified that the marginals are constant, i.e. Q˜
1(x1) =
Q˜2(x2) =
3
8
. Since any EPIC allocation rule q1(x1, x2) has to be non-decreasing in x1 for all
x2, the only way to match this constant marginal is if q
1(x1, x2) is independent of x1 (and,
likewise, q2(x1, x2) is independent of x2). Among the feasible EPIC allocation rules that match
the constant marginals of 3
8
, the one that maximizes social surplus is given by
q1(x1, x2) =
{
0 if x2 <
1
4
1
2
if x2 ≥ 14
and q2(x1, x2) = q
1(x2, x1).
The EPIC rule produces the same marginals as the BIC allocation rule and, hence, there
exist transfers such that the EPIC rule yields the same interim expected utilities for the bidders.
However, the sum of the expected transfers is larger under the EPIC mechanism. This can be
verified by comparing the expected social surplus under the BIC and EPIC mechanisms:
W =
2∑
i,j=1
i 6= j
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(xi + αxj)q
i(x1, x2)dx1dx2
A straightforward computation shows that the social surplus under BIC and EPIC is given by
W = 3
8
+ 1
2
α and W = 3
8
+ 15
32
α respectively. So with value interdependencies (α > 0), the
designer would have to insert money to implement an equivalent EPIC mechanism.
More generally, consider an environment with linear value interdependencies: agent i’s
value from alternative k equals aki xi +
∑
j 6=i a
k
ijxj for some non-negative a
k
ij (see also Jehiel and
Moldovanu, 2001). Straightforward extensions of Theorems 1 and 2 hold for this environment,
and can be used to construct for any BIC allocation rule an EPIC rule that produces the
same marginals and, hence, the same interim expected utilities for all agents. However, with
interdependent values, social surplus is not determined by marginals alone and the constructed
EPIC mechanism may generate less social surplus.
Multi-Dimensional Signals
There are two reasons why an equivalence result for multi-dimensional signals is not to be
expected. First, monotonicity is not sufficient for implementation, and it must be complemented
by an “integrability” condition, reflecting the various directions in which incentive constraints
may bind (see, e.g., Rochet, 1987; Jehiel et al., 1999). Second, Gutmann et al. (1991) show
that their result fails for higher dimensional marginals, which corresponds here to conditional
expected probabilities given a multi-dimensional type. We explore here the first reason.
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Consider a two-unit auction with I = 2 ex ante symmetric bidders whose types are equally
likely to be x1 = (1, 1), x2 = (2, 1), or x3 = (5, 3), where the first (second) number represents
the marginal value for the first (second) unit. Note that marginal values are non-increasing for
all three types, i.e. goods are substitutes. For simplicity we assume that both units sell so that
there are only K = 3 possible alternatives: bidder 1 wins both units (k = 1), both bidders win
a unit (k = 2), and bidder 2 wins both units (k = 3). It is a standard linear-programming
exercise to find a BIC allocation rule that maximizes seller revenue
q˜1 =

1
2
11
20
0
9
20
0 0
1 1 0
 ,
with q˜3 = (q˜1)T and q˜2 = 1−q˜1−q˜3. Interim transfers that support this allocation rule as part of
a BIC mechanism and preserve interim individual rationality are given by (T˜ (x1), T˜ (x2), T˜ (x3)) =
(−21
30
,−23
30
,−147
30
) for both bidders, resulting in expected seller revenues of R = 191
45
.
The allocation rule is not DIC, however. To see this, suppose the rival bidder’s type is x1.
Then the condition for a bidder of type x1 not to report being of type x2 is t21− t11 ≤ 1
10
, where
the superscripts correspond to the bidder’s type and the other’s type respectively. Similarly,
the condition for a bidder of type x2 not to report x1 is t21 − t11 ≥ 3
20
, a contradiction.18 An
allocation rule that maximizes seller revenue under the DIC constraints is given by
q1 =

1
2
1
2
0
1
2
1
2
0
1 1 0
 ,
and q3 = (q1)T and q2 = 1− q1 − q3. The transfers that support this allocation rule as part of
a DIC mechanism are
t =
 −1 −1 0−1 −1 0
−5 −5 −5
 ,
where rows correspond to the bidder’s own type and columns to the other bidder’s type. The
resulting seller revenue is R = 38
9
. In other words, the optimal DIC mechanism produces strictly
less revenues than the optimal BIC mechanism.
Non-Linear Utilities
We can reinterpret the multi-dimensional type example of the previous subsection in terms
of non-linear utilities. A bidder’s utility when her type is xj and the alternative is k, for
18In other words, when the opponent’s type is x1 the allocation rule violates one of Rochet’s (1987) cycle
conditions for dominant strategy implementability. However, the allocation rule does satisfy the “averaged”
cycle conditions (where the average is taken over the opponent’s type) that are necessary and sufficient for
Bayesian implementation, see Mu¨ller, Perea, and Wolf (2007).
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j, k = 1, 2, 3, is summarized by the matrix 2 1 03 2 0
8 5 0
 .
Obviously, only a non-linear model can fit all the payoffs in the matrix. Consider the one-
dimensional types, y1 = 1, y2 = 2, and y3 = 5, and, for both bidders, the non-linear utility
functions gk(y) for k = 1, 2, 3, with g1(y) = 1
6
(y)2 + 1
2
y + 4
3
, g2(y) = y, and g3(y) = 0. It is
readily verified that this non-linear model reproduces the utilities in the above matrix. Hence,
bidders’ interim expected utilities and their incentives to deviate are identical to those in the
multi-dimensional example, and again there is an optimal BIC mechanism that produces strictly
higher revenues than is possible under DIC implementation.
5. Discussion
This paper establishes a link between dominant strategy and Bayesian implementation in social
choice environments. When utilities are linear and types are one-dimensional, independent,
and private, we prove that for any social choice rule that is Bayesian implementable there
exists a (possibly different) social choice rule that yields the same interim expected utilities
for all agents, the same social surplus, and is implementable in dominant strategies. While
Bayesian implementation relies on the assumptions of common prior beliefs and equilibrium
play, dominant strategy implementation is robust to changes in agents’ beliefs and allows agents
to optimize without having to take into account others’ behavior.
This paper also delineates the boundaries for BIC-DIC equivalence. When types are corre-
lated, Cremer and McLean (1988) provide an example where a BIC mechanism yields strictly
higher seller revenue than is attainable by any DIC mechanism. The examples in Section 4.2
show that BIC implementation may result in more social surplus or more revenue when values
are interdependent, types are multi-dimensional, or utilities non-linear.
In general, the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation thus requires
linear utilities and one-dimensional, independent, and private types. When these conditions
are met, Bayesian implementation provides no more flexibility than dominant strategy imple-
mentation.
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A. Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. The intuition behind the proof is to relate the solution to that of
Lemma 1 by taking a discrete approximation. For i ∈ I, n ≥ 1, li = 1, . . . , 2n, define the
sets Si(n, li) = [(li − 1)2−n, li2−n), which yield a partition of [0, 1) into 2n disjoint intervals of
equal length. Let Fni denote the set consisting of all possible unions of the Si(n, li). Note that
Fni ⊂ Fn+1i . Also let l = (l1, ..., lI) and S(n, l) =
∏
i∈I Si(n, li), which defines a partition of
[0, 1)I into disjoint half-open cubes of volume 2−nI . Let {q˜k}k∈K define a BIC mechanism and
consider, for each i ∈ I, the averages
q˜k(n, l) = 2nI
∫
S(n,l)
q˜k(x)dx (A.1)
El−i v˜i(n, l) = 2
n
∫
Si(n,li)
Ex−i v˜i(x)dxi (A.2)
Since q˜k(x) ≥ 0 and ∑k q˜k(x) = 1 we have q˜k(n, l) ≥ 0 and ∑k q˜k(n, l) = 1. By construction∑
l−i v˜i(n, l) = 2
n(I−1)El−i v˜i(n, l), which is non-decreasing in li by (A.2).
Lemma 1 applied to the case where, for each i ∈ I, Xi = {1, . . . , 2n} and λi is the discrete
uniform distribution on Xi, implies there exist {qk(n, l)}k∈K with qk(n, l) ≥ 0 and
∑
k q
k(n, l) =
1 such that
∑
l−i vi(n, l) =
∑
l−i v˜i(n, l),
∑
l q
k(n, l) =
∑
l q˜
k(n, l), and vi(n, l) is non-decreasing
in li for all l.
For each i ∈ I, n ≥ 1 define qk(n,x) = qk(n, l) for all x ∈ S(n, l). Then qk(n,x) ≥ 0,∑
k q
k(n,x) = 1, and for each i ∈ I, vi(n,x) is non-decreasing in xi for all x. Furthermore∫
Si(n,li)
Ex−i v˜i(x)dxi = 2
−nEl−i v˜i(n, l) = 2
−nI∑
l−i v˜i(n, l) = 2
−nI∑
l−i vi(n, l)
=
∑
l−i
∫
S(n,l)
vi(n,x)dx =
∫
Si(n,li)×[0,1]I−1 vi(n,x)dx
Thus vi(n,x)−Ex−i(v˜i(x)) integrates to 0 over every set Si × [0, 1]I−1 with Si ∈ Fni . Similarly
qk(n,x) − q˜k(x) integrates to 0 over every set [0, 1]I . Consider any (weak*) convergent subse-
quence from the sequence {qk(n,x)}k∈K for n ≥ 1, with limit {qk(x)}k∈K. Then {qk(x)}k∈K
defines a DIC mechanism that is equivalent to {q˜k(x)}k∈K. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. The intuition behind the proof is to relate the unique solution to (1)
to that of the uniform case of Lemma 2. Recall that if the random variable Zi is uniformly
distributed then λ−1i (Zi) is distributed according to λi.
19 Hence, consider for all i ∈ I and
z ∈ [0, 1]I , the functions q˜′k(z) = q˜k(λ−11 (z1), . . . , λ−1I (zI)). Since
Ez−i(v˜
′
i(z)) = Ex−i(v˜i(λ
−1
i (zi),x−i))
the mechanism defined by {q˜′k}k∈K is BIC and by Lemma 2 there exists an equivalent DIC
mechanism {q′k}k∈K where q′k : [0, 1]I → [0, 1]. In particular, q′ minimizes Ez(||v(z)||2) and
19Where λ−1i (zi) = inf{xi ∈ Xi|λi(xi) ≥ zi}.
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satisfies the constraints q′k(z) ≥ 0, ∑k q′k(z) = 1, and Ez−i(v′i(z)) = Ex−i(v˜i(λ−1i (zi),x−i)) for
all i ∈ I. Now define {qk}k∈K with qk : X → [0, 1] where qk(x) = q′k(λ1(x1), . . . , λI(xI)).
Then {qk}k∈K solves (1) since Ex(||v(x)||2) = Ez(||v′k(z)||2) and qk(x) ≥ 0,
∑
k q
k(x) = 1,
and Ex−i(vi(x)) = Ez−i(v
′
i(λi(xi), z−i)) = Ex−i(v˜i(x)) for all i ∈ I and xi ∈ Xi. Furthermore,
vi(x) =
∑
k a
k
i q
k(x) =
∑
k a
k
i q
′k(λ1(x1), . . . , λI(xI)) is non-decreasing in xi for all k ∈ K, x ∈ X
since {q′}k∈K is a DIC mechanism, λ is non-decreasing, and aki ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2. We first show the necessary conditions (3) and (4) are also sufficient.
Consider (3) which ensures that deviating to an adjacent type, e.g. from xn−1i to x
n
i , is not
profitable. Now consider types xpi < x
q
i < x
r
i . We show that if it is not profitable for type x
p
i
to deviate to type xqi and it is not profitable for type x
q
i to deviate to type x
r
i then it is not
profitable for type xpi to deviate to type x
r
i . The assumptions imply
V˜i(x
p
i )x
p
i + T˜i(xpi ) ≥ V˜i(xqi )xpi + T˜i(xqi ), V˜i(xqi )lqi + T˜i(xqi ) ≥ V˜i(xri )xqi + T˜i(xri )
and, hence,
V˜i(x
p
i )x
p
i + T˜i(xpi ) ≥ V˜i(xri )xpi + T˜i(xri ) + (V˜i(xri )− V˜i(xqi ))(xqi − xpi ) ≥ V˜i(xri )xpi + T˜i(xri )
since V˜i(xi) is non-decreasing and x
q
i > x
p
i . Similarly, if it is not profitable for type x
r
i to deviate
to type xqi and it is not profitable for type x
q
i to deviate to type x
p
i then it is not profitable for
type xri to deviate to type x
p
i . The same logic applies to the DIC constraints in (4).
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Next, consider the transfers defined by (5). Note that the BIC constraints (3) imply that
xn−1i ≤ αni ≤ xni for n = 2, . . . , Ni, which, in turn, implies that the difference in DIC transfers
τi(x
n−1
i ,x−i)− τi(xni ,x−i) = (vi(xni ,x−i)− vi(xn−1i ,x−i))αni
satisfies the bounds in (4). Let {qk}k∈K denote a solution to minimization problem in (1).
Lemma 1 ensures that the associated vi(x) is non-decreasing in xi for all i ∈ I, x ∈ X, and by
construction Vi(xi) = Ex−i(vi(xi,x−i)) = V˜i(xi). Taking expectations over x−i in (5) yields
Ti(xni ) = T˜i(x1i )−
n∑
m=2
(Vi(x
m
i )− Vi(xm−1i ))αmi
= T˜i(x1i ) +
n∑
m=2
(T˜i(xmi )− T˜i(xm−1i )) = T˜i(xni )
for n = 1, . . . , Ni. Hence, ui(xi) = Vi(xi)xi + Ti(xi) = V˜i(xi)xi + T˜i(xi) = u˜i(xi), i.e. the DIC
mechanism (q, t) yields the same interim expected utilities as the BIC mechanism (q˜; t˜).
The expected social surplus is the same because Ti(xi) = T˜i(xi) for all xi ∈ Xi and the ex
ante expected probability with which each alternative occurs is the same under the BIC and
DIC mechanisms. Q.E.D.
20Importantly, this derivation does not apply to multi-dimensional types, see Section 4.2.
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